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Abstract
In several instances, third-party payers negotiate prices of health
care services with providers. We show that a third-party payer may
prefer to deal with a professional association than with the sub-set
constituted by the more e–cient providers, and then apply the same
price to all providers. The reason for it is the increase in the bargaining
position of providers. The more e–cient providers are also the ones
with higher proflts in the event of negotiation failure. This allows them
to extract a higher surplus from the third-party payer.
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1 Introduction
The simultaneous existence of a public flnancing entity (third-party payer)
and private providers of health care motivates the existence of contracts
governing the relationship between the third-party payer and the providers.
A popular contractual form is the setting of fee for service - the flnancing
institution pays a pre-determined amount for a given service per each patient
treated. Despite a general trend towards difierent contractual forms, in some
countries and for certain services provided this approach is still dominant.1
One such example is the Portuguese dialysis sector, although the princi-
ple we highlight is general and applies to many other circunstances. In Por-
tugal, a National-Health-Service (NHS) type of health system is in place.2
The public sector is clearly unable to treat all patients sufiering cronic re-
nal insu–ciency. Thus, resorting to the private sector has been essential
for patients to access health care. The Portuguese NHS has, however, the
flnancial responsability over the care provided to these patients. Hence, the
NHS contracts with the private sector the value to be paid by dialysis ses-
sion done. This is likely to remain the main payment system in the future,
although some reform proposals for the flnancing mechanism have been put
forward by the private sector.
Besides dialysis, other medical specialties and diagnostic exams are paid
according to the same system. Typically, the value of this fee is set in
a negotiation procedure between the NHS and an association represent-
ing providers. The case of dialysis provision is, however, difierent. Two
providers gained considerable market share and reached a position of mar-
ket dominance. There is no precise information on available on the number
of patients treated by each company. Publicly available estimates point to
the two largest companies having about two-thirds of the existing clinics
in the country. Currently, there are 26 NHS hospitals able to provide dial-
1See Mossialos and Le Grand (1999, pp.17{19) for a review of payment systems for
health care providers in the European Union.
2For a recent overview of the Portuguese health care system, see European Observatory
on Health Care Systems (1999).
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ysis treatment, while there are 63 private clinics. The private providers
are essential to the health systema, as NHS hospitals devote their capacity
to acute patients that are in the hospital for other reasons (or for kidney
transplant) but still need to do their dialysis sessions. Since they also have
the ones with largest capacity, it is reasonable to expect that about 70%
of the patients are served by these two companies. The remaining private
market is served by a number of smaller companies, with several cases of
one company { one flrm. Moreover, the two largest providers are vertically
integrated multinationals, operating at lower marginal costs. Acquisition
of equipment and consumables is made at internal transfer cost (which for
our economic analysis corresponds to marginal cost pricing), while smaller
companies have to buy on the market. Since the market is not perfectly
competitive, they pay inputs above marginal cost. Thus, they are a cost
disadvantage relative to vertically integrated multinationals. Currently, the
NHS negotiates the price of a dialysis session with the two largest compa-
nies and extends the agreed price to all companies. The association of the
providers is actually run be representatives of these two companies. Thus,
even though the association performs the negotiation, it has been accused
of serving only the interests of the two major companies. Also, there were
accusations of side negotiations with the largest companies. We can see this
situation has having the NHS negotiating only with two largest companies.
The interesting economic question here is whether the NHS would do
better negotiating with an association instead of selecting the two largest
companies as preferential partners. At flrst sight, a negotiation with the
largest companies, which are also more e–cient in production, may lead to
lower prices. These flrms can accommodate lower prices due to the smaller
production costs. Negotiating with an association would mean that the in-
terests of smaller, ine–cient, companies would be considered, driving prices
up-
This view, however, neglects that the more e–cient companies may be
tougher negotiators, and thus obtain a better price, which is extended af-
terwards to all other companies. The bargaining strength comes from the
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fallback value in case of failure in negotiations. Assuming that patients will
be treated, even if at cost of direct payments, the more e–cient companies
will have relatively higher proflts. Thus, they will be more demanding in ne-
gotiations than a sectoral association, because the latter takes into account
the relatively low proflts of the less e–cient companies. Consequently, if the
association is willing to concede a less favorable surplus division to avoid
failure of negotiations. Therefore, the negotiation with the more e–cient
flrms may beneflt all the providers and lead to higher expenditure by the
NHS.
The argument is, naturally, dependent on the assumption made about
the event of negotiation failure. If, alternatively, we assume that patients
will not be treated (at least, by these providers), then the reinforcement
of bargaining power of providers associated with the negotiation procedure
including only the more e–cient ones does not exist. It just remains the
flrst efiect: more e–cient flrms are more willing to take lower prices. In this
case, the NHS beneflts from negotiating with the more e–cient providers
only, instead of doing it with a sectoral association. In our motivating
example, the nature of the disease justifles the presumption that patients
will be treated even if at own-pocket payment (cronic renal insu–ciency if
not compensated by dialysis or a kidney transplant leads to death). Thus,
we conclude that the NHS should negotiate with a sectoral association and
not with the more e–cient, largest, providers.
The next sections are devoted to the formal exposition of the argument.
The second section shows that without asymmetries, it is irrelevant whether
the negotiation is done with the a subset of companies or with an association.
The third section introduces cost asymmetries and establishes our main
result. Next, the fourth section shows the result to be reversed if patients
are not treated in the event of negotiation failure. Finally, section flve
presents some concluding remarks.
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2 The model
We consider a setting where a third-party payer, say a National Health Ser-
vice (NHS), has to negotiate prices of health care services with the providers.
We assume, for the moment, zero production costs in the provision of health
care and the existence of two providers. This assumption is relaxed in a lat-
ter section.
Price negotiation can be done under two difierent regimes. In the flrst
one, the providers join a sectoral or professional association. The association
negotiates the price with the NHS. In the second regime, the NHS negoti-
ates the price with the provider and extends the agreed price to the contract
involving the other provider. In particular, when cost asymmetries exist we
assume the NHS to negotiate with the more e–cient provider. This assump-
tion and its implications are discussed in the flnal section. The negotiation
process is described by the Nash bargaining solution.3
In case of failure of to reach an agreement, both providers compete in
the market. We assume providers to be characterized by horizontal product
difierentiation at the eyes of the consumer. The difierentiation can be due
to geographical distance and/or to subjective preferences of the consumer,
for example. This means that we model market interaction as a Hotelling
product difierentiation situation. Providers are located at the endpoints of
a segment [0,1]. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the line, with
mass 1.
The NHS has value R from which it must pay providers. Having free
funds is positively valued by the NHS as it allows for its productive appli-
cation elsewhere in the health sector. We interpret R as net of the fallback
value for the NHS in case of negotiation failure. We assume R to be high
enough to pay all care demanded by consumers.
Denote by ƒi; i = 1; B the proflts of each provider and by „ƒi; i = A;B
3Extensive presentations of the non-cooperative bargaining theory are Binmore et
al. (1986), Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Roth (1985), among others.
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their proflts in the case of negotiation failure. Proflts are then given by
ƒA = xpA;ƒB = (1¡ x)pB; (1)
where pi; i = A;B, is the price received by each provider and x is the
indifierent consumer between the choice of provider A and of provider B.
This indifierent consumer is deflned by
x =
1
2
¡ pA ¡ pB
2t
(2)
The parameter t re°ects product difierentiation, and it is modeled as the
\transport cost" of not consulting the most preferred type of provider.4
According to our assumptions, when the NHS negotiates with an associ-
ation that takes into account the interests of both players, the equilibrium
price, p, is the solution to the following program:
max
p
› = (R¡ƒA ¡ƒB)–
¡
ƒA + ƒB ¡ „ƒA ¡ „ƒB
¢1¡–
; (3)
where – denotes the bargaining power of the NHS (– 2 (0; 1)). It is easy to
check that ƒA + ƒB = p and „ƒa + „ƒB = t. Thus, the flrst-order condition
of the above program can be written as:5
¡–(p¡ t) + (1¡ –)(R¡ p) = 0 (4)
Thus, the equilibrium price is:
p⁄ = –t+ (1¡ –)R (5)
Consider now the case where the NHS negotiates with, say, provider A and
applies the resulting price to provider B as well. The program to be solved
is:
max
p
› = (R¡ƒA ¡ƒB)–
¡
ƒA ¡ „ƒA
¢1¡– = (R¡ p)– (p=2¡ t=2)1¡–
s:t: ƒB ‚ 0 (6)
4See Hotelling (1929) or a textbook treatment such as Tirole (1988).
5It is straightforward to check that the second-order condition for a maximum of this
program holds.
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Note that although the NHS negotiates with provider A only, it takes into
account that the same price will apply to the other provider. A further
requirement is that provider B makes non-negative proflts. Thus, market
demand will be equally split. The above expression makes already use of
proflt deflnitions. It is clear that it yields the same solution of the flrst pro-
gram. Since flrms are symmetric, any price that gives non-negative proflts
to provider A also ensures the constraint to be satisfled. The negotiation
will, in fact, give strictly positive proflts to both providers. Thus, under
symmetry of providers, the NHS and providers are indifierent between the
two alternative procedures. The next section departs from this symmetric
world.
A side point to note here is that under negotiation providers always
earn more than in the standard private market equilibrium. Once can then
question why does the third-party payer exists in the flrst place. To answer
the question, remember that health care demand is, at the beginning of a
period, stochastic. This leads directly to insurance demand and to an active
role for third-party payers. Moreover, the value of insurance (either publicly
or privately provided) exceeds that of health care provision, leaving some
surplus to be shared between the third-party payer and providers. In the case
of cronic conditions, the main argument for a third-party payer is an equity
one, as well, at least in NHS-like health systems. People should not be forced
to pay the full costs of their treatments for solidarity reasons. Some patients
may lack the flnancial means to access the health care they need in a pure
private health care market. The health flnancing system provides insurance
coverage against the event of having a chronic condition. In either case,
we flnd justiflcation for R greater than the providers’ equilibrium proflts
in a private market, and therefore for a negotiation dividing the available
surplus.
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3 Negotiating with asymmetric providers
We now assume that provider A is more cost e–cient. Provider B has a
production cost c per patient treated. Now, the equilibrium in a private
market without a third-party payer is not symmetric. It is characterized by
pA =
c+ 3t
3
; pB =
3t+ 2c
3
and „ƒA =
(c+ 3t)2
18t
; „ƒB =
(3t¡ c)2
18t
: (7)
The above proflts deflne the fallback values for the providers in case of
negotiation failure.
When the NHS negotiates with sectoral/professional association, the
equilibrium solves the following program:
max
p
› = (R¡ p)–
ˆ
p¡ c
2
¡ (c+ 3t)
2
18t
¡ (3t¡ c)
2
18t
!1¡–
(8)
Solving the flrst-order condition yields the equilibrium price:
p+ = (1¡ –)R+ –
ˆ
c
2
+
(c+ 3t)2
18t
+
(3t¡ c)2
18t
!
(9)
Equilibrium proflts are given by
ƒA = p=2; ƒB = (p¡ c)=2: (10)
Consider now the negotiation with the more e–cient provider, which is also
the largest one. The price determined by the negotiation applies to both
providers. The program to be solved is:
max
p
›0 = (R¡ p)–
ˆ
p
2
¡ (3t+ c)
2
18t
!
s:t:
1
2
(p¡ c) (11)
Let’s consider, flrst, the problem without the constraint of non-negative
proflts for provider B. Afterwards, we will show that provider B has strictly
positive proflts as well.
The flrst-order condition leads, after manipulation, to the following equi-
librium price:
p0 = (1¡ –)R+ – (c+ 3t)
2
9t
(12)
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We know, from the bargaining process, that the equilibrium price must be
such that
p >
(3t+ c)2
9t
(13)
Thus, if
(3t+ c)2
9t
¡ c > 0 (14)
holds, then provider B makes strictly positive proflts. This condition can
be rewritten as:
c2 + 3t(3t¡ c) > 0 (15)
In the private market equilibrium, prices must cover costs. Thus, from (7),
we require 3t ¡ c > 0. Hence, condition (15) always holds and the non-
negative proflt constraint in problem (11) is not binding in equilibrium.
It is straightforward to see that
p0 ¡ p+ = c=6 > 0: (16)
Thus, the price is higher than when the NHS negotiates with an association.
Since a uniform price is set in both cases, demand is evenly split between
the two providers, and both earn higher proflts if the NHS negotiates with
the more e–cient one.
The result derives from the tougher position taken by the more e–cient
provider. Since it is relatively more e–cient it has less to lose in the event
of negotiation failure. This drives the price up, and more than compensates
the downward efiect of lower costs of production.
This implication is consistent with the observed facts. In the Portuguese
dialysis sector, the NHS negotiates prices for each dialysis session with the
two largest providers. The price settled in this agreement is then applied to
all companies. Surprisingly enough, the smaller companies have not been
claiming for a role in the price-determination process. Given that it is rea-
sonable to assume the largest providers to be the more e–cient ones, as they
are subsidiaries of vertically integrated multinationals, our model presents
an explanation for the current happiness of all flrms with the status quo.6
6Although you flnd some complaints in press, flrms have not taken any real decision
to change matters.
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All flrms beneflt from the tougher position of the largest flrms, compared to
what would be the stance of an association that includes all providers.
4 Providers without outside option
To see that the main efiect comes through the bargaining position induced by
a better fallback value, consider the following alternative situation in case
of negotiation failure: the NHS is able to totally divert patients to other
treatment alternatives.7 In terms of the negotiation process, this means
that negotiation failure leads to zero demand for both providers. In this
case, the fallback value for both providers is zero. Computations similar to
those in the previous section show the equilibrium price to be, when the
NHS negotiates with an association,
p+ = R(1¡ –) + –c=2; (17)
while the equilibrium price if the NHS negotiates with the more e–cient
provider is:
p0 = R(1¡ –): (18)
And it follows directly that
p0 < p+: (19)
From the point of view of the third-party payer, it is better to negotiate with
the more e–cient provider and apply that price to the second provider. The
result reverses that of the previous section. The crucial difierence is that,
in the latter situation, shifting from a negotiation with an association to
a negotiation with the more e–cient provider does not change the fallback
value of providers in case of breakdown in negotiations. The mechanism
that weakened thw position of the NHS does not exist here.
7This is done possibly at a higher cost. If this is so, the value R can also difier to
the previous case. In particular, it would be higher in the current section than in the
previous one. Such a case would strengthen our case of Section 3. The price comparison
of equation (19) below would not be clearcut.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this note, we addressed a simple, but economically signiflcant, question:
should a NHS (or a third-party payer, in general) negotiate prices of health
care services with professional associations, or should it negotiate only with
the more e–cient ones and apply the resulting price to all providers? The
flrst alternative has been common, but the second one can also be found in
the health care sector.
We showed that the apparent beneflt of negotiating with the more ef-
flcient providers { obtaining lower prices { can be more than outweighted
by a stronger bargaining position of the provider, when compared to an
association. This is so because a representative association incorporates in
its decisions also the (relatively larger) decline in proflts of the less e–cient
flrms in the event of negotiation failure.
In the context of the motivating example, the clear policy implication is
that the Portuguese NHS should avoid to negotiate with the largest providers
in the dialysis market. Instead, it should promote negotiations over prices
with an association representative of all providers’ interests. According to
our flndings, all providers beneflt from the partial negotiation. So, the
association will not take over price negotiations without pressure from the
NHS for that to happen.
Some caveats to the model need to be presented. Given our results, it
is tempting to draw another policy implication. By reversing the argument,
the NHS should attempt to negotiate with the less e–cient providers and
then apply this price to all providers. Such procedure, however, seems to
be quite di–cult to implement in political terms, especially if the less ef-
flcient providers are also the smaller ones in the market. In addition, if
the ine–ciency is large enough, a too high price may result anyway. Thus,
considering that the NHS has the option to negotiate with the more e–-
cient/largest providers seems the more reasonable one.
Another assumption deserving discussion is that only one negotiation is
done. Alternatively, one could think of a sequential bargaining procedure.
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In such a case, the NHS would negotiate flrst with one provider and then
with the other. We preclude this as typically price discrimination on the
fee per session is seen as undesirable and usually faces strong opposition
by providers. Also, conducting sequential negotiations adds considerably
to transaction costs. The settlement of prices may take several months
and involves use of real resources by both parties. Taking together these
two elements, we flnd reasonable to assume that only one negotiation takes
place and the resulting price applies to all providers.
Summarizing, whenever a third-party payer negotiates prices with providers,
it will do better by doing it with an association inclusive of all providers if
the providers are asymmetric in production costs and face valuable out-
side options, in comparison with negotiating with a set of the more e–cient
providers. This flnding reassesses the role for professional associations in
price determination processes, at least in some health care markets.
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